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Abstract 
This paper performs a Structural VAR analysis on UK economy using 
quarterly non-interpolated data from 1981 to 2005 in the attempt to verify 
and quantify private consumption’s response to different components of 
public expenditure (government consumption, social spending and wage 
component). Our findings suggest that any empirical support of competing 
theoretical models on the issue would probably benefit from a 
disaggregation of government expenditure, rather than focusing on the 
aggregate measure. In fact, while shocks to pure government consumption 
trigger a RBC-like reduction in private consumption, shocks to the non-
systematic component of social spending generate positive reaction, in line 
with the “credit-constrained-agents” approach. The cumulative impact on 
GDP after three years of a government spending shock (close to a negative 
1% of GDP) is twice as much the social spending shock, with opposite sign. 
Government wage shocks do not seem to have any significant effects on 
private consumption. Public expenditure composition, rather than level, 
seems to be actually playing the most crucial role when it comes to 
aggregate demand support via effects on private consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The severity of the last economic downturn following the global financial crisis has intensified the 
search for the typology of public expenditure able to maximize the short-term impact on economic 
activity. As recovery plans’ specifications differ across countries, the very basic question remained the 
same: which fiscal policy weapon is associated with the highest multiplier? The attempt to evaluate the 
fiscal policy’s effectiveness has often resulted on the sign and magnitude of (actual or cyclically-
adjusted) budget deficit’s impact on GDP. Perotti (2007) provides a good review on the comparison 
between different theoretical models and their empirical predictions regarding the impact on income. In 
this paper, we investigate a slightly different question: how do different categories of public 
expenditure affect private consumption? 
The relevance of the issue rests on private consumption’s major weight among aggregate demand’s 
components, as showed by Figure 1. This in turn is the reason why consumption’s response to 
economic stimulus plans is the key determinant of output multipliers.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to answer this question, we perform a structural VAR analysis on the  UK economy, using 
quarterly non-interpolated data from 1981 to 2005. In line with some recent studies (Beetsma et al. 
2006, Beetsma 2008, Giordano et al. 2007, Cavallo 2005 and 2007, Monacelli and Perotti 2008) we do 
not focus on public finance aggregates but rather on budget deficit’s single components. Our 
disaggregation is mainly on the expenditure side, as we are primarily concerned with the aggregate 
consumption effects of different public expenditure categories. Unlike many of the above-mentioned 
contributions, we do not limit ourselves to the identification of wage and non-wage components of 
public expenditure, but rather distinguish among government consumption, government wage 
expenditure and social spending. 
Our results, robust to a number of alternative specifications, show that the only component 
resulting in a positive and significant response of private consumption is social expenditure, defined as 
the sum of social security benefits and subsidies, net of social security contributions. On the other hand, 
government consumption seems to have a negative and significant effect, whereas wage expenditure 
has no impact. Regarding the magnitude of those effects, in our benchmark model the cumulative 
impact on private consumption of a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP is in absolute 
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terms higher than the one (of the same magnitude) to the social expenditure component: while shocks 
to the former lead to a -0.9% impact on GDP, shocks to the latter cause a +0.5% cumulative response. 
A consequence of our analysis is that using total government expenditure (by aggregating the three 
components above) does not seem to be a reasonable simplification: in fact, when these three 
components of government expenditure enter the VAR in a unique aggregate measure, the  result is a 
zero-impact on private consumption (see section 4), as also found by Perotti (2004)1. Instead, 
disaggregating public expenditure conveys more detailed and differentiated information on its actual 
capabilities to affect private consumption.  
We believe these results to be relevant for the theoretical debate between alternative and 
competing approaches modelling private consumption’s impact of fiscal shocks. As it is well known, 
the standard neoclassical RBC model predicts a fall in consumption following a government 
expenditure shock, because of the Ricardian equivalence: higher public spending must be matched by 
an equivalent increase in taxation in present discounted terms, therefore intertemporal optimizing 
consumers suffer from a negative wealth effect that decreases consumption. Effects on output are 
positive due to increased labor supply, triggered by the wealth effect. Since virtually no study seems to 
confirm the prediction of the standard neoclassical model (as pointed out by Galì, Lopez-Salido and 
Valles 2007), New Keynesian tradition attempted to reconcile theory with empirical evidence and 
rescued a consumption-enhancing role for fiscal policy. This has been accomplished either using finite-
horizons frameworks (Blanchard 1985) or introducing credit-constrained agents and rule-of-thumb 
consumers (Mankiw, 2000, Galì et al 2004, 2007)2. This latter approach has particularly gained 
considerable attention. It includes a fraction of non-Ricardian households who do not optimize over the 
life cycle and are thus forced to consume out of current income, so that their consumption responds 
promptly to a fiscal policy impulse3. A further research strand explicitly considers the per se 
government expenditure’s impact on consumption. This is often carried out by an ad-hoc utility 
function specification where private and public consumption are entered in a non-additive form, so to 
obtain a non-zero impact of one on the marginal utility of the other (Bouakez and Rebei 2003, Marattin 
2008); on the other hand, there is a large non-VAR empirical literature attempting to assess the sign 
                                                 
1 Perotti finds a non-significant effect of fiscal shocks on consumption for the period 1980-2000. We confirm this finding, 
with an aggregate measure of consumption, over a 1981 – 2005 sample. 
2 As a matter of fact, there is also a third way to the same result. Ravn et al. (2004) obtain a positive effect on consumption 
with credit-constrained agents, but assuming that the representative individual forms consumption habits on the individual 
variety in a monopolistic competition setting, rather than on aggregate consumption.  
3 As discussed by Galì, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), the presence of non-Ricardian consumers must be coupled with 
sticky prices and imperfectly competitive markets in order to obtain a private consumption’s positive response. 
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and the magnitude of the relationship (Aschauer 1985, Campbell and Mankiw 1990, Graham and 
Himarios 1991, Graham 1993, Karras 1994, Ni 1995, Amano and Wirjanto 1998, Okubo 2003, Fiorito 
and Kollintzas 2004) which however led to mixed and inconclusive evidence. 
The present study can be relevant for all the above-mentioned theoretical discussions. We 
provide evidence that – at least in our case study – considering the indistinct aggregate of government 
expenditure can indeed be very misleading. The identification of social expenditure as the only 
government expenditure category which is effective in stimulating private consumption leads to two 
remarks: (i) the complementarity/substitutability issue cannot be discussed independently from a 
sufficient disaggregation of government expenditure (ii) the rule-of thumb-consumers approach can 
indeed be justified no longer on the assumption of an exogenous fraction of credit constrained agents, 
but on the existence of a precise portion of public expenditure that stimulates a fraction of consumers, 
specifically those who are the beneficial of social expenditure (presumably the lower part of income 
distribution), and who consume out of it.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model, the data 
and discusses the identification procedure. Section 3 contains the estimation results (impulse response 
analysis and variance decomposition) with particular regard to the reaction of private consumption to 
different kinds of government expenditure shocks. Section 4 deals with robustness and sensitivity 
analysis, by estimating several different variations of the benchmark VAR model. Section 5 concludes 
and discusses policy implications. 
 
2. Variables and model specification 
 
The benchmark specification of our model is a seven-variables VAR, whose reduced form is defined by 
the following dynamic equation: 
                                                                1( )t tY c A L Y U− t= + +                                                            (1) 
where  [ ], , , , , ,t t t t t t tY C T P GC GSS GW B= t  is the vector of variables composed by private consumption 
(Ct), net government taxes (Tt), consumer price index (Pt), government consumption ( ), 
government outlays in social security ( ), government wage expenditure ( ) and government 
financial liabilities (
tGC
tGSS tGW
tB ). ( )A L  is an auto regressive lag polynomial, and  is the vector of reduced-
form innovations. The VAR also includes a constant ( ) and a linear time trend, although we omit the 
latter from the notation for convenience.  
tU
c
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“The availability of quarterly fiscal variables represents the main constraint for the analysis of fiscal 
policy with VAR models” (Giordano et al. 2008, p. 6). Furthermore, Perotti (2004) correctly warns 
against the distortions coming from the usage of quarterly data set obtained by interpolation of yearly 
values. This remark makes the data availability constraint even more binding, and poses considerable 
limitations to the implementation of a fully-equipped large scale time series analysis. We have chosen 
to sacrifice the generality of our conclusions in favour of a complete non-interpolated quarterly data 
set; this paper focuses on United Kingdom, and uses data from 1981Q1 to 2005Q44.  
The source for almost all of the variables that we used is the OECD Economic Outlook No 835. 
The benchmark specification includes: the log of real private final consumption expenditure per capita 
C, the log of real taxes per capita T (defined as the sum of direct and indirect taxes, other receipts and 
property income received by government), the harmonized consumer price index P6, the log of real 
government consumption per capita GC (defined as the sum of government final non-wage expenditure 
and other current outlays), the log of real government social expenditure per capita GSS (defined as the 
sum of net social security benefits and subsidies), the log of real government final wage expenditure 
per capita GW, the log of real government financial liabilities per capita B. Additional variables used 
for robustness checks include the log of real GDP per capita, the short term interest rate on government 
bonds, and the sum of the three components of government expenditure, GTOT. All real variables are 
deflated by the GDP deflator. Population data come from the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. 
We estimate the seven equations of system (1) independently using least squares. The number 
of lags is set to five according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the absence of serial correlation 
in the residuals, positively checked with a Lagrange Multiplier test7. Moreover, we failed to reject the 
hypothesis of normality of residuals with the Jarque-Bera statistics and we checked the stability 
condition of the VAR, finding that all eigenvalues comfortably lie inside the unit circle.  We also tested 
for the presence of cointegrating relationships among the variables, finding mixed evidence according 
to the rank and the maximum eigenvalue tests. Due to that, and given that our a priori did not include a 
meaningful long-run relationship among the variables, we decided not to impose any cointegrating 
                                                 
4 This period has been chosen because of the strong evidence that points towards a structural break between 1981 and the 
previous period (Perotti, 2004). 
5 The quarterly data of the Economic Outlook are normally obtained by interpolation, but not those of the UK.  
6 Here the source is UK National Statistics. 
7 The chi-square statistics for autocorrelation up to first and second order and 2 are 54.0872 and 33.7088 which imply p-
values, respectively, of 0.2863 and 0.9528. Different criteria for lag length selection (final prediction error, AIC, SIC) led to 
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restriction and, thus, estimate the VAR with the variables in levels (Sims et al. 1990, Giordano et al. 
2008). 
We turn now to the identification issue. The literature on fiscal policy VARs has traditionally 
adopted two alternative strategies in order to identify exogenous and unexpected fiscal shocks 
(Beetsma, 2008). The first one identifies deviations of fiscal policy from its systematic path by using 
dummy variables so to capture specific episodes that can reasonably be interpreted as exogenous and 
unforeseen (Ramsey and Shapiro 1999, Burnside et al 2004, Romer and Romer 2007, Monacelli and 
Perotti 2008). Such a strategy has the advantage of being simple and straightforward, as it is relatively 
easy to justify and does not require any additional assumption; on the other hand, it might lack the 
appropriate accuracy, since the resulting impulse response functions might be affected by the delayed 
effects of previous events who are not captured by the contemporaneous effect of the dummy. The 
second strategy – more widespread - imposes alternative types of structural restrictions: they can be 
sign restrictions on the impulse response functions (Uhlig 2005, Mountford and Uhlig 2005, Canova 
and Pappa 2007,Enders et al 2008), external and institutional information exploiting the quarterly 
nature of data and fiscal policy decision lags (Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Perotti 2004, Muller 2008, 
Monacelli and Perotti 2008), or restrictions on contemporaneous relations among variables and error 
terms in the structural form (Marcellino 2006, Beetsma et al 2006, Beetsma 2008, Benetrix and Lane 
2009).  
Our identification strategy is the latter. In particular, we adopt a Cholesky factorization so to 
recover the vector of structural shocks tε  (and its variance Ω ) from the reduced-form error  in (1), 
according to the following scheme: 
tU
                               (2) 
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The Cholesky ordering as in (2) is equivalent to assuming the following set of conditions. Consumption 
a number of lags smaller than three, but dealing with quarterly data on fiscal policy we decided to disregard these options as 
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is the most endogenous variable and it is therefore affected by all contemporaneous values of all the 
variables of the VAR; this is natural, as the present study is primarily concerned with the analysis of 
macroeconomic effects on private consumption. Tax revenue is allowed to depend on prices and all 
fiscal variables, assuming that the government operates under a balanced budget-like stance8. Nominal 
rigidities in the form of delayed price adjustments justify the fact that the general price index is not 
affected by demand conditions within the quarter. Fiscal variables are modelled as the most exogenous 
ones, starting from the real stock of government liabilities, which can legitimately be considered as 
given in a quarterly data set; government wage expenditure is assumed to be the most rigid among 
spending categories, as its dynamics are usually governed by collective contracts whose length is well 
beyond the quarter. Social expenditure and government purchases of goods and services are thought to 
be featured by lower degrees of exogeneity in the ordering. Note that all government expenditure 
categories are allowed to depend on debt. Although our scheme can be arguable (as it is often the case 
in a Cholesky ordering), we believe that the data frequency grants us a sufficient degree of flexibility in 
the choice; we also provide a number of robustness checks in section 5 so to strengthen the general 
validity of our benchmark estimation. 
 
3. Estimation results 
 
3.1 Impulse response analysis 
Figures 2a-c display the results of our baseline model.  
 
FIGURE 2a, 2b, 2c ABOUT HERE 
 
Each figure displays the response of all the 7 variables of the model to each one of the three 
government spending variables shocks equal to 1 percent of GDP (Figures 2a, 2b and 2c display the 
responses to shocks in GC, GSS and GW respectively). In order to derive the 16th and 84th percentiles 
of the impulse-response distribution in the figures, we perform Monte Carlo simulations and assume 
normality in the parameter distribution. Based on that information, we construct t-tests based on 1000 
different responses generated by simulations, and check whether the point estimates of the mean 
impulse-responses are statistically different from zero. The responses of private consumption are 
                                                                                                                                                                       
we preferred to include at least one year of observations. 
8 Automatic effects of VAT taxation within the quarter are neglected. 
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expressed as shares of GDP by multiplying the response from the VAR (which is expressed in logs) by 
the sample average share of private consumption in GDP (as in Monacelli and Perotti, 2006).  
Notice, first, that shocks in government consumption and in social spending lead to opposite effects on 
private consumption: while the first depresses it, as predicted by neoclassical models, the second 
increases it, as assumed by the New Keynesian approach. Both responses are statistically significant at 
conventional levels, as shown in Tables 1a-c. Both shocks are very persistent, even though the effects 
are perceived after three and five quarters in case of, respectively, government consumption and social 
spending. The former reaches the peak after 9 quarters, with a cumulative (negative) impact of -0.7% 
of GDP; the latter after 10 quarters, with a cumulative (positive) impact of 0.4%. It is interesting to 
note that the cumulative impact after three years of a government spending shock is approximately 
double the one of social spending, with reversed signs: shocks to government consumption lead to a -
0.9% reduction in GDP, whereas shocks to social spending cause a +0.5% cumulative output response. 
On the other hand, shocks in government wage expenditure have no significant effects on consumption. 
It is worth mentioning the fact that a shock in net taxes seems to affect positively consumption, thereby 
implying a Ricardian effect of tax-based fiscal consolidation - but the effects are not statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
3.2 Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition analysis is complementary to the impulse response analysis presented 
above, since it is informative on the relative power of each shock in explaining the forecast error 
variance of the VAR equations at different forecast horizons. In particular, we look at the contribution 
of innovations in the three components of government spending to the forecast error variance of the 
private consumption equation.  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3 shows that, consistently with the impulse response analysis, the proportion of the forecast 
error variance in the private consumption equation explained by government consumption and social 
spending is considerably larger than the one explained by the wage expenditure. Moreover, government 
consumption and social spending have a similar importance in explaining the variance of private 
consumption (they are both slightly below 20% after 15 periods). Finally, note that the forecast error 
variance attributable to the 3 components of government expenditure overwhelms even the variance 
 8
attributable to private consumption itself after 10 periods. This is a confirmation of the importance of 
the role played by fiscal policy innovations in determining private consumption’s dynamics.  
 
4. Robustness  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we estimated several different VARs to verify whether 
baseline model’s response of private consumption to shocks in the government expenditure variables 
are confirmed within alternative specifications. Our robustness check proceeds along three steps. 
The first one is made of three slight modifications of the baseline model. First we exclude the time 
trend from the estimation; then we add quarterly dummies, as conventional in the literature (Monacelli 
and Perotti 2006); finally we include (along with the time trend and seasonal dummies) an additional 
dummy accounting for Labour party terms in office (specifically, since 1997Q2). The motivation for 
this test lies in the nature of the relationship this paper investigates: given the non-negligible 
differences in the stance towards government expenditure by Conservative and Labour governments, 
we wanted to check whether any differences can be observed in the empirical analysis.  
 Figures 4, 5 and 6 show, respectively, impulse response functions related to the three above 
specifications of our first robustness step. 
 
FIGURE 4, 5, 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 As it can be easily seen, our  results are robust – in terms of significance and sign of responses -  to 
these changes to the baseline model (Table 2, 3 and 4 in the Appendix contains the details of the 
responses).  
The second step includes the variation of the VAR dimension and/or variables. Again, the 
results hold across these different specifications. Figure 7 (with details in Table 5 in the Appendix) 
shows the results of a 7-variables VAR with the short term interest rate in place of government 
financial liabilities (this alternative variable is taken into account in various previous studies, such as 
Marcellino 2006 and Monacelli and Perotti 2007). Figure 8 (and Table 6) displays the result of a 7-
variables VAR containing the log of real GDP per capita instead of the price index from the baseline 
model. 
 
FIGURE 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE 
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 Figure 9,10 and 11 (and Tables 7-9) show the results of three 6-variables VARs resulting from the 
exclusion of, respectively, financial liabilities, net taxes and the price index. Once more, the negative 
effects of a government consumption shock and the positive effects of shocks in social spending are 
well supported by the data.  
 
FIGURE 9,10 AND 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
As final exercise of this second step, we estimate a more parsimonious 5-variables VAR containing 
consumption, price index and the three components of government expenditure. Results in Figure 12 
(and Table 10) are again confirmed.  
 
FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our third and final step is maybe the most relevant. We estimate four 5-variables VARs where, 
compared to the baseline model, each government expenditure category is included separately as the 
only component; finally, we estimate a specification where we recompose our disaggregation by 
including the total aggregate expenditure (GTOT) obtained by summing up the three components that 
we analysed separately so far9.  
 
FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 13 presents the impulse response functions of our third robustness step. In particular, we 
can notice that the effects of total government expenditure shocks on consumption are not significantly 
different from zero, thereby pointing to a general ineffectiveness of public spending in stimulating 
private consumption. However, each component has a different quantitative and qualitative impact on 
consumption, and results are the same as in our benchmark 7-variables model and throughout the 
robustness checks. A general point can be made about the lagged response of private consumption to 
GC and GSS, that we observe in virtually all our estimates: while the (negative) effect of the former is 
significant pretty soon after the shock, the (positive) effect of social spending becomes statistically 
significant later (after 5/6 quarters). This result might suggest a tempting interpretation, based on the 
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theoretical debate we base our empirical analysis upon. Since credit-constrained agents consume out of 
the social expenditure they benefit from, it is plausible to observe a time lag between the moment when 
the spending decision is approved (when we observe the public expenditure shock), and the moment 
when the agents’ disposable income is actually affected (when private consumption reacts). On the 
other hand, the quicker (negative) response to government consumption might suggest a RBC-like 
anticipation effect: the mere approval of an increase in that component triggers a reduction in private 
consumption, following the negative wealth effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper carried out an empirical analysis on UK economy using quarterly non-interpolated data 
from 1981 to 2005. Our objective was to verify and quantify the effects of different broad categories of 
government expenditure on private consumption. Our findings, robust to a number of alternative 
specifications of the SVAR, can be summarized as follows. Private consumption seems to respond: i) 
negatively to government purchases of goods and services; ii) positively on social spending; iii) not 
significantly to government wage expenditure. While i) seems to confirm the standard neoclassical 
wealth effect, ii) strengthens the competing theoretical approach, known as the “credit-constrained” 
agents (who, in our interpretation, can be identified as the individuals social expenditure is targeted to, 
as it provides them with the resources to consume out of). Quantitative estimates of the responses’ 
magnitude in our benchmark specification lead to an important policy implication: shocks to 
government consumption have a cumulative impact on GDP after three years – via private consumption 
-  that is twice as much the one of social spending, with opposite signs. This suggests that any 
expansionary effect of social expenditure might be potentially offset by a parallel increase in pure 
government consumption, with a negative effect on aggregate demand even though a overall increase 
in aggregate government expenditure has occurred. This result is strengthened by our robustness tests, 
showing that trying to measure the fiscal multiplier on private consumption by considering the whole 
government expenditure aggregate – and not its decomposition according to features and goals – can 
indeed be misleading.  
While we believe that this analysis can represent a useful contribution to a more effective management 
of fiscal policy tools on the expenditure side, the general validity of the findings is certainly limited by 
the closed-economy one-country investigation. A panel-VAR analysis on EMU countries would permit 
                                                                                                                                                                       
9 Note that this aggregate variable adds up exactly to government expenditure net of debt service payments. 
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the use of easily-available annual data, allowing a more complete answer to our original question, 
would probably be the most rationale next step. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Private consumption as percentage of GDP in main industrialized countries 
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Figure 2a: responses of all variables to a shock of GC 
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Figure 2b: responses of all variables to a shock of GSS 
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Figure 2c: responses of all variables to a shock of GW 
-2.8
-2.4
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
B
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
C
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
GC
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
GSS
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
GW
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
P
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19
Figure 3: forecast error variance decomposition, private consumption 
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Figure 4: consumption responses, baseline model without the time trend 
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Figure 5: consumption responses, baseline model with quarterly dummies 
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Figure 6: consumption responses, baseline model with quarterly dummies, trend and Labour dummy 
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Figure 7: consumption responses, 7-variables VAR with the short term interest rate 
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Figure 8: consumption responses, 7-variables VAR with GDP 
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Figure 9: consumption responses, 6-variables VAR (no financial liabilities) 
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Figure 10: consumption responses, 6-variables VAR (no net taxes) 
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Figure 11: consumption responses, 6-variables VAR (no price index) 
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Figure 12: consumption responses, 5-variables VAR (with the three components of government expenditure) 
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Figure 13: consumption responses, four 5-variables VARs, responses to one government expenditure variable at a time 
(note: differently from the previous figures, these are the results of 4 different VARs) 
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Tables  
 
Table 1a: responses of all variables to a shock of GC 
  Shock in GC 
response of ---> C T P GC GSS GW B 
0 -0.017 0.042 -3.328* 1.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.044** 0.027 -5.081*** 0.680*** -0.307* -0.003 -0.067 
2 0.000 0.055 -1.081 0.415*** -0.003 0.138** -0.042 
3 -0.075*** 0.068 -0.692 0.414*** 0.141 0.213*** -0.052 
4 -0.087*** -0.024 -0.228 0.306*** 0.218 0.119* -0.093 
5 -0.087*** -0.038 -0.662 0.408*** 0.419** 0.104 0.000 
6 -0.093*** 0.022 2.659 0.427*** 0.475** 0.206*** 0.068 
7 -0.090*** -0.011 1.973 0.290*** 0.555** 0.238*** 0.152 
8 -0.092*** -0.024 0.650 0.317*** 0.651** 0.182*** 0.271 
9 -0.103*** -0.059 -0.815 0.333*** 0.521** 0.180*** 0.424 
10 -0.090** -0.081 1.140 0.254** 0.566** 0.234*** 0.587 
11 -0.078** -0.065 -1.139 0.276*** 0.531** 0.204*** 0.722 
12 -0.076** -0.064 -2.860 0.268*** 0.473* 0.171*** 0.817 
13 -0.065* -0.064 -4.770 0.251*** 0.424 0.174*** 0.908 
14 -0.053 -0.038 -4.176 0.255*** 0.362 0.199*** 0.947 
15 -0.046 -0.004 -6.355* 0.270*** 0.218 0.146** 0.956 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%     
 
Table 1b: responses of all variables to a shock of GSS 
  Shock in GSS 
response of ---> C T P GC GSS GW B 
0 0.009 0.065** 1.767* -0.029 1.000*** 0.000 0.000 
1 0.027** -0.021 0.139 0.109* 0.582*** 0.002 -0.010 
2 0.014 -0.051* -0.900 -0.005 0.371*** 0.094*** 0.022 
3 0.006 -0.033 -1.007 0.050 0.292** 0.071** 0.146 
4 0.018 -0.124*** -0.894 0.020 0.247** 0.035 0.266** 
5 0.031** -0.094*** -3.020** -0.046 0.195* 0.047 0.360*** 
6 0.044*** -0.069** -3.282** -0.097 0.035 0.129*** 0.396*** 
7 0.051*** -0.065** -3.422** -0.078 0.048 0.095*** 0.374*** 
8 0.054*** -0.032 -3.710** -0.025 -0.045 0.038 0.295** 
9 0.053*** -0.003 -4.560** -0.009 -0.240 0.025 0.198 
10 0.055*** 0.028 -3.911** -0.062 -0.322** 0.053 0.074 
11 0.051** 0.045 -3.683** -0.039 -0.387** 0.022 -0.071 
12 0.044** 0.058* -3.066 -0.051 -0.439*** -0.011 -0.210 
13 0.039** 0.072** -2.617 -0.061 -0.454*** -0.018 -0.328* 
14 0.034* 0.077** -1.340 -0.072 -0.438*** -0.006 -0.441** 
15 0.028* 0.075** -0.703 -0.068 -0.418** -0.025 -0.540** 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%     
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Table 1c: responses of all variables to a shock of GW 
  Shock in GW 
response of ---> C T P GC GSS GW B 
0 0.018 0.201** -1.924 -0.772*** 0.109 1.000*** 0.000 
1 0.065 0.244*** -4.025 -0.341* 0.107 0.470*** -0.096 
2 0.029 0.135 -2.367 -0.531*** -0.148 0.113 -0.112 
3 0.011 0.089 -1.756 -0.281 -0.388 0.101 -0.091 
4 0.047 0.038 -6.273 -0.501*** -1.099*** 0.359*** -0.209 
5 0.085 0.051 -10.007** -0.262 -1.113*** 0.063 -0.407 
6 0.072 0.080 -8.992* -0.256 -0.918** 0.009 -0.550 
7 0.092* 0.079 -7.785 -0.265 -0.862** 0.021 -0.755* 
8 0.099* 0.121 -9.910* -0.310 -1.050** 0.034 -0.996** 
9 0.081 0.141 -9.799* -0.131 -1.120** -0.108 -1.212*** 
10 0.074 0.115 -7.101 -0.117 -1.010** -0.074 -1.348*** 
11 0.088 0.138 -5.558 -0.066 -0.983** -0.035 -1.470*** 
12 0.085 0.157 -5.530 -0.106 -1.031** 0.005 -1.566*** 
13 0.074 0.125 -3.573 -0.089 -0.855* 0.004 -1.617*** 
14 0.066 0.076 -1.110 -0.060 -0.724 0.047 -1.645** 
15 0.061 0.054 0.696 -0.027 -0.685 0.066 -1.672** 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%     
 
Table 2: responses of private consumption, baseline model without the time trend 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.013 0.008 0.022 
1 -0.031 0.024** 0.069* 
2 0.016 0.013 0.035 
3 -0.052* 0.007 0.024 
4 -0.053* 0.021 0.066 
5 -0.041 0.035* 0.105* 
6 -0.040 0.049** 0.089 
7 -0.033 0.058*** 0.101 
8 -0.035 0.062*** 0.101 
9 -0.048 0.061*** 0.075 
10 -0.036 0.062*** 0.055 
11 -0.026 0.059*** 0.055 
12 -0.030 0.053** 0.039 
13 -0.027 0.049** 0.018 
14 -0.022 0.045** 0.004 
15 -0.021 0.040*** -0.003 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
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Table 3: responses of private consumption, baseline model with quarterly dummies 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.015 0.013 0.018 
1 -0.052** 0.029** 0.058* 
2 -0.002 0.013 0.016 
3 -0.081*** 0.008 0.007 
4 -0.090*** 0.024 0.040 
5 -0.096*** 0.034** 0.077* 
6 -0.105*** 0.046*** 0.060 
7 -0.102*** 0.053*** 0.081 
8 -0.101*** 0.057*** 0.092 
9 -0.117*** 0.058*** 0.076 
10 -0.100*** 0.061*** 0.065 
11 -0.092** 0.057** 0.082 
12 -0.085** 0.049** 0.085 
13 -0.074** 0.047** 0.076 
14 -0.058* 0.043** 0.067 
15 -0.259 0.036** 0.063 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
 
Table 4: responses of private consumption, baseline model with quarterly dummies, trend and Labour dummy 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.025 0.009 0.009 
1 -0.059*** 0.029*** 0.047 
2 -0.009 0.011 0.012 
3 -0.096*** 0.006 0.022 
4 -0.107*** 0.022 0.053 
5 -0.113*** 0.030** 0.114** 
6 -0.120*** 0.040** 0.088* 
7 -0.112*** 0.047*** 0.113** 
8 -0.107*** 0.053*** 0.113* 
9 -0.123*** 0.054*** 0.107* 
10 -0.106*** 0.057*** 0.091 
11 -0.096*** 0.053*** 0.112* 
12 -0.089** 0.044** 0.106* 
13 -0.076** 0.042** 0.098* 
14 -0.060* 0.038** 0.082 
15 -0.051 0.033** 0.076 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
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Table 5: responses of private consumption, 7-variables VAR with the short term interest rate 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.025 0.011 0.062** 
1 -0.036* 0.023** 0.110*** 
2 0.000 0.015 0.084** 
3 -0.067*** 0.017 0.071* 
4 -0.076*** 0.030** 0.094** 
5 -0.088*** 0.051*** 0.118** 
6 -0.086*** 0.062*** 0.110** 
7 -0.082*** 0.066*** 0.124** 
8 -0.084*** 0.069*** 0.108* 
9 -0.092*** 0.067*** 0.098* 
10 -0.079** 0.064*** 0.085 
11 -0.073** 0.063*** 0.081 
12 -0.069** 0.055*** 0.057 
13 -0.061** 0.049*** 0.040 
14 -0.050* 0.043** 0.021 
15 -0.046 0.038** 0.006 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
 
Table 6: responses of private consumption, 7-variables VAR with GDP 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.001 0.009 0.070** 
1 -0.027 0.034*** 0.129*** 
2 0.014 0.025* 0.113*** 
3 -0.055** 0.019 0.105** 
4 -0.070** 0.031* 0.124*** 
5 -0.084*** 0.048*** 0.140*** 
6 -0.087*** 0.057*** 0.120** 
7 -0.079** 0.066*** 0.135** 
8 -0.079** 0.072*** 0.132** 
9 -0.089*** 0.070*** 0.095 
10 -0.082** 0.074*** 0.077 
11 -0.077** 0.074*** 0.075 
12 -0.075** 0.065*** 0.042 
13 -0.061** 0.060** 0.014 
14 -0.054* 0.054*** -0.003 
15 -0.052* 0.046** -0.018 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34
Table 7: responses of private consumption, 6-variables VAR (no financial liabilities) 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.014 0.010 0.060 
1 -0.034 0.025** 0.109*** 
2 0.000 0.015 0.094** 
3 -0.072*** 0.010 0.082* 
4 -0.088*** 0.021 0.103** 
5 -0.097*** 0.033** 0.132*** 
6 -0.097*** 0.042** 0.121** 
7 -0.089*** 0.048*** 0.131** 
8 -0.090*** 0.051*** 0.125** 
9 -0.093*** 0.052*** 0.104* 
10 -0.081*** 0.056*** 0.083 
11 -0.072** 0.058*** 0.074 
12 -0.068** 0.053*** 0.048 
13 -0.059** 0.050*** 0.021 
14 -0.049 0.046*** -0.002 
15 -0.042 0.041** -0.020 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
 
Table 8: responses of private consumption, 6-variables VAR (no net taxes) 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.018 0.010 0.022 
1 -0.041** 0.025** 0.066* 
2 0.006 0.013 0.039 
3 -0.071*** 0.008 0.019 
4 -0.079*** 0.017 0.046 
5 -0.077*** 0.031** 0.073 
6 -0.077*** 0.043*** 0.054 
7 -0.074*** 0.048*** 0.075 
8 -0.072** 0.052*** 0.082 
9 -0.082** 0.051*** 0.064 
10 -0.070** 0.049*** 0.049 
11 -0.060** 0.045** 0.059 
12 -0.060* 0.036** 0.055 
13 -0.055 0.030* 0.045 
14 -0.046 0.028* 0.042 
15 -0.045 0.023 0.042 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
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Table 9: responses of private consumption, 6-variables VAR (no price index) 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.001 0.003 0.050 
1 -0.019 0.016 0.103*** 
2 0.024 0.001 0.071 
3 -0.047 -0.006 0.067 
4 -0.047 0.004 0.116** 
5 -0.043 0.014 0.158*** 
6 -0.041 0.021 0.136** 
7 -0.036 0.026 0.145** 
8 -0.037 0.029 0.144** 
9 -0.050 0.030 0.122* 
10 -0.039 0.033* 0.088 
11 -0.031 0.033* 0.078 
12 -0.031 0.027* 0.056 
13 -0.028 0.028* 0.031 
14 -0.026 0.028* 0.006 
15 -0.027 0.027* -0.005 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
 
Table 10: responses of private consumption, 5-variables VAR (with the three components of government expenditure) 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> G GSS GW 
0 -0.016 0.013 0.219** 
1 -0.029 0.027** 0.426*** 
2 0.007 0.019 0.419*** 
3 -0.061** 0.015 0.406*** 
4 -0.073*** 0.022 0.490*** 
5 -0.079*** 0.030** 0.569*** 
6 -0.079** 0.036** 0.494*** 
7 -0.073** 0.039** 0.527*** 
8 -0.071** 0.042*** 0.518*** 
9 -0.075** 0.044*** 0.459** 
10 -0.063** 0.047*** 0.392* 
11 -0.056* 0.050*** 0.369* 
12 -0.055* 0.046*** 0.292 
13 -0.049* 0.043*** 0.210 
14 -0.041 0.042*** 0.141 
15 -0.037 0.039*** 0.080 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
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Table 11: responses of private consumption, four 5-variables VARs with one government expenditure variable at a time 
(note: differently from the previous tables, these are the results of 4 different VARs) 
  Consumption responses 
shock in ---> GTOT G GSS GW 
0 0.006 -0.022 0.007 0.011 
1 0.003 -0.048** 0.013 0.020 
2 0.000 -0.022 0.006 -0.014 
3 -0.023 -0.074*** 0.001 -0.044 
4 -0.017 -0.086*** 0.014 -0.022 
5 -0.011 -0.089*** 0.031 -0.020 
6 -0.009 -0.087*** 0.039* -0.037 
7 -0.004 -0.092*** 0.048** -0.046 
8 -0.003 -0.095*** 0.052** -0.043 
9 -0.003 -0.097*** 0.053** -0.052 
10 -0.002 -0.088** 0.054** -0.059 
11 -0.002 -0.082** 0.052** -0.060 
12 -0.002 -0.079** 0.050** -0.059 
13 -0.002 -0.072** 0.045** -0.061 
14 -0.001 -0.064** 0.040** -0.057 
15 0.001 -0.056* 0.036** -0.052 
***, **,  *: significant at 1%, 5%, 10%  
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